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Abstract 
Unlike the Federal Government, which has the unique legal power to issue a national 
currency, state and local governments (SLGs) depend on their revenue capacity for spending.  
Thus, the quality of public services provided by SLGs depends on adequate, stable funding and 
long-term commitments.  This paper begins with an evaluation of the general fiscal condition of 
SLGs, meanwhile discerning specific budget areas that have become particularly distressed, such 
as education, healthcare, and infrastructure.  Chapter 3 deals with how SLGs engage in 
municipal finance with private financial institutions.  Finally, the fourth chapter presents how 
arranging a system of public banks across the United States can help alleviate fiscal distress for 
SLGs and redirect credit to promote public welfare.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
State and local governments (SLGs) have the right to tax their population in their 
promises to provide and maintain essential public services.  Unlike the Federal Government, 
which has the unique legal power to issue a national currency, SLG spending depends on their 
revenue capacity.  Thus, the quality of public services depends on adequate, stable funding and 
long-term commitments.  Funding problems (coupled with morally-absent pubic officials) can 
lead to emergencies, such as the recent water crisis in Flint, MI, in which the city switched water 
sources to reduce the shortfall in their water fund.1   
According to the Obama administration, the US has come a long way since the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), noting extensive job growth over 75 straight months and a 75-percent 
reduction in the annual Federal Government budget deficit.2 US corporations are once again 
making record profits while financial markets are undergoing the second-longest bull market 
ever, though, they seem to be the only major beneficiaries of the recovery.3`  Wage stagnation 
and worsening inequality is burdening the working classes, especially those living in poverty, as 
Americans are working longer hours for relatively less pay all while the cost of living becomes 
evermore expensive.   
Occupy Wall Street is one of among several movements that protested growing inequality 
and rampant white-collar crime after the GFC, albeit with little success.  Much of the outcry 
focused on the fraudulent and unethical behavior of large private financial firms, realizing how 
the US economy has become dominated by financial rent-seekers trying to extract wealth from 
the bottom quintiles through debt servitude.  Governments can also fall into a debt trap, such as 
the seemingly perpetual debt that Greece owes to the Troika.  SLGs in the US are in a similar 
predicament, as they too must find revenue to pay excessive interest and fees to creditors.  One 
way to counter the current system of predatory private finance is to develop an alternative 
mechanism for municipal finance based on a public-utility model of egalitarian and 
environmentally responsible principles. 
This paper begins with an evaluation of the general fiscal condition of SLGs, meanwhile 
discerning specific budget areas that have become particularly distressed, such as education, 
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healthcare, and infrastructure.  Chapter 3 deals with how SLGs engage in municipal finance with 
private financial institutions.  Finally, the fourth chapter presents how arranging a system of 
public banks across the United States can help alleviate fiscal distress for SLGs and redirect 
credit to promote public welfare.   
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Chapter 2: Fiscal Distress 
The National Association of State Budget Officers 2013 Fiscal Survey of the States leads 
the executive summary with, “...fiscal distress is finally beginning to subside for most states.”  
There are several ways to tackle this qualitative question.  This chapter will assess whether SLGs 
are under fiscal distress, and to what extent that has had an effect on public institutions and 
welfare.  One method to assess fiscal health is to analyze the surplus/deficit of SLGs – the annual 
balance of inflows and outflows – and discern expenditure trends in comparison to revenue 
capacity.  Another way is to evaluate SLG receipts of federal assistance, which may signal a lack 
of ability on behalf of SLG to fulfill obligations.  Yet another method would be study the 
financial performance of SLG using a variety of measures, such as liquidity tests, municipal 
bond ratings, debt-to-income ratios, and coverage of fixed obligations (e.g. pensions).   
Of course, all of these approaches have their flaws, as they are based on different sets of 
data coupled with statistical problems.  There are countless differences among cities now and in 
the past, not to mention overlapping jurisdictions, and institutional idiosyncrasies.  Different 
budget items may be managed by different state agencies, which could discrepancies simply due 
to accounting methods.  We must be cautious of statistical incomparability between individual 
state and local governments and the aggregate numbers.  Nonetheless, this chapter will 
synthesize all of these techniques to survey the fiscal health of SLG, while mentioning the 
strengths and weakness of such analyses.  
Budget Surplus/Deficit 
Ten years later and the world is still recovering from the GFC, which wiped out upwards of $19 
trillion of household wealth in the United States alone.4  According to U.S. Census Bureau data 
from the 2012 Census of Governments, between 2007 and 2012, total expenditures for state and 
local governments increased by 18.2 percent, from $2.7 trillion to $3.2 trillion, while total 
revenue declined 1.1 percent, from $3.1 trillion to $3.0 trillion.  Moreover, in the same five-year 
period, total assets decreased to $5.3 trillion from $5.4 trillion, while total debt increased to $2.9 
trillion from $2.4 trillion.  Much of the shortfall in the years around the GFC can be explained by 
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drained SLG tax capacity and inflated expenditures due to automatic stabilizers (e.g. 
unemployment compensation).  Thus, SLGs are fiscally distressed when total expenditures 
exceed total revenues (i.e. when there is a deficit), in which case they would have to use rainy 
day funds or implement austerity (raise taxes and cut spending) since they cannot issue their own 
currency like the Federal Government can.   
 Figure 1 suggests that SLG are back in fiscal health since the GFC, reporting a surplus of 
$215.4 billion in 2013. By the same logic, SLG would seem to be fiscally healthy should total 
revenue exceed total expenditures, thus accumulating cash reserves or an amount available to 
subsidize future tax reduction.  However, before we interpret a surplus as a signal of fiscal health 
we must consider how the surplus is measured. If a surplus means a positive the level of reserves 
we must then narrow our revenue measurements appropriately.  Total SLG revenue as reported 
by the Census Bureau includes additions to the assets of state and local government pension 
funds.  However, they should not be considered revenue for general government operations since 
Figure 1 – State and Local Government Surplus/Deficit 
Total revenue minus total expenditure (Census numbers) 
Source: https://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
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pension funds are owed to individuals, not the SLG government.  Subtracting pension fund 
surpluses from total SLG revenue yields general government revenue; although this is a better 
measure of fiscal health, it is still flawed in measuring the amount of free reserves available.   
 
Figure 2 – SLG Operating Surplus/Deficit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The general government surplus includes both current and capital expenditures, but only 
a portion of capital financing (i.e. it includes capital grants, but not net borrowing). Therefore, a 
positive general government surplus is interpreted as, “the excess of current revenues and grants 
over all current and capital expenditures.” 5 [Bahl 1984, p. 37]  In other words, whatever revenue 
is left over can be used for debt retirement or to accumulate reserves. A general government 
deficit would require SLG to raise revenue (taxes, fees, etc.) or borrow funds to cover capital 
expenditures. Figure 2 is a better representation of SLG fiscal health by eliminating the 
aforementioned measurement flaws.  Essentially, an operating surplus represents the amount 
available to finance capital expenditures, reduce taxes, raise expenditures, or accumulate 
reserves. Rather than having a surplus in recent years, which Figure 1 suggests, SLGs have been 
Source: https://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
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operating in deficit ever since the commodity bubble of 2001.  Moreover, SLG budgets have 
been stagnating in deficits in the past few years, unable to reach balance. SLG budgets were hurt 
more by the recession than they were helped by the subsequent stimulus.  Whatever reserves 
were accumulated in prior expansionary periods were most likely wiped out by the GFC.  SLG 
have not recovered the provision of resources for critical areas that were cutback in the recession, 
as they are still about $8 billion short from a balanced operating budget in 2013, which could 
mean they are having trouble returning to an operating surplus on their own.   
 
Figure 3 – Federal Grants-in-Aid to SLGs 
 
 
Surely the federal government must be aware of its subsector fiscal distress. Indeed, 
much federal aid was provided to SLG in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
which allocated $144 billion, or 18% of the total package, to state and local fiscal relief.  Figure 
Source: https://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
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3 delineates historical data of federal aid allocated to SLGs, showing increased aid when SLGs 
needed to secure income, transfer payments, and housing and community services. All three 
areas saw a sharp uptick in federal aid after the GFC, while generally rising on trend.  From 1992 
to 2013, revenue from the federal government grew approx. 4 percent as a share of SLG general 
revenue, from 18 to 22 percent.  These findings do not necessarily mean the Federal Government 
is increasingly trying to rescue SLGs.  Federal aid has tapered in recent years, which implies that 
SLGs have recovered and found some stability.  Some SLGs have received less support from the 
Federal Government.  Federal aid for New York has shrunk as a share of revenues for local 
governments; total federal and state aid combined grew at an average rate of 2.2 percent annually 
from 2001 to 2011, slower than the rate of inflation (2.4 percent).6 Communities would have 
been hit much harder had the federal government not intervened. It is worth noting that the 
amount of federal aid given to SLGs after the crisis pales in comparison to the assistance given 
to megabanks by the Federal Reserve.7 While it is good that the Federal Government is 
increasingly spending on welfare and social services, such a trend may be signaling a 
deterioration of job and income security.  Besides the states with unique advantages (e.g. North 
Dakota’s oil endowment), SLG budgets are spreading thinner and thinner.  
Unlike the federal government who issues its own currency, SLGs need revenue to 
finance spending.  Therefore, SLG resort to spending cuts, federal aid, and or borrowing to meet 
their obligations when they experience shortfalls in the operating budget. Borrowing money over 
the short-term can be a temporary solution to minor budget problems, but extended shortfalls 
cannot be solved by continued borrowing and have real implications for communities; pension 
contributions are not met, infrastructure deteriorates, and public school budgets are cut.  Some 
SLG are even prohibited by law against budgeting for an operating deficit. If austerity and 
borrowing do not work and the city no longer has enough funds to meet its obligations, the 
situation can escalate into a crisis or financial emergency, such as defaulting on a bond payment 
or, filing for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection.  Collapsed revenue sources also have significant 
ramifications for SLGS, which was the case during the GFC when property tax revenue was 
wiped out.   
While operating deficits signal fiscal distress, an operating surplus may represent (an 
attempt to return to) fiscal health, enabling SLG to build up cash reserves for precautionary 
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reasons, such as natural disasters or fluctuations in the business cycle, to retire debt, or to 
develop human capital and infrastructure.  However, an operating surplus for a number of SLG 
does not imply a healthy fiscal position for all SLG.  A surplus in one state may be offset by a 
deficit in another, and it is possible for an aggregate surplus to exist even if most SLG are 
financially distressed.  Similarly, a state may report a surplus while many of its local 
governments face fiscal troubles. Excess revenue does not necessarily indicate fiscal health, as it 
could have been the temporary result of service cutbacks, reductions in capital expenditures and 
employment, and or deferred compensation.  Nonetheless, although looking at the aggregate 
operating surplus/deficit can hint to the fiscal status of SLGs as a whole, a closer look at the 
budgets is necessary to better determine the extent of their fiscal distress. 
Having looked at SLG budgets as a whole, the next step is to build an understanding of 
the key budget items that are driving SLG into surplus/deficit.  While it is important for SLGs to 
financially plan for adequate funding sources, attention is directed to expenditures before 
revenues in the budgetary process, as appropriation bills precede revenue bills in legislatures.  If 
SLG cannot raise the appropriate funds by taxation, other sources of revenue must be found.  
Expenditures 
Education is the largest budget item for state and local government, representing 27.6 
percent of expenses in 2012, according to the aforementioned Census report.  Direct expenditure 
on education is an even greater portion of local government budgets in particular, on average 
representing 40 percent of total local government expenditures.  In 2013, expenditure for 
education increased by 1.8 percent, to $599.2 billion from $588.3 billion in 2012. However, such 
increases in spending are not going towards improving the infrastructure of education.  Rather, 
from 2007 to 2012, capital spending for education fell 7.9 percent, from $91.7 billion to $84.5 
billion, with most of the decline occurring in elementary and secondary education.8  Thus, the 
United States seems to be spending more on education to make up for massive cuts to payrolls 
and resources after the Global Financial Crisis.   
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Table 1: Rate of growth total revenue (TR) per pupil and total expenditure (TE) 
 2012-2013 2011-2012 2010-2011 2009-2010 2008-2009 2007-2008 
TR per Pupil 0.2% 0.5% 0.5% 1.8% 3.0% 6.1% 
TE per Pupil 1.2% 0.8% 0.3% 1.7% 3.6% 6.4% 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "National Public 
Education Financial Survey (State Fiscal)" 
Table 1 shows the growth of total expenditures per pupil exceeds that of total revenues.  
Rising costs of education are likely to continue in the future, and the stagnation of revenue from 
education only worsens fiscal strain on state and local governments.  Downsizing usually solves 
funding problems, since education expenditure is mostly for instruction (teacher salaries, 
textbooks, etc.).9 A survey conducted by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found that at 
least 31 states provided less state funding per student in the 2014 school year than in the 2008 
school year, while the cuts were over 10 percent in at least 15 states.10  It has been hard for local 
governments in particular to raise revenue for education without raising property taxes, 
considering the fact that, on average, around 46 percent of school revenues in the United States 
come from state funds. Thus, spending cuts at the state level force local governments to 
downsize to cover budget gaps.  Although education expenditures are growing faster than 
revenue, the size of the education budget is kept under control.  SLGs are the beneficiaries of 
federal grants for education; the Office of Management and Budget projects education spending 
for elementary, secondary, and higher education to account 6 percent of total federal 
discretionary spending in 2015.  
SLG budgets are more vulnerable to the expenditures that are not so readily controlled.  
Public welfare expenditure, consisting of social services and income maintenance, is the second 
largest budget item for SLGs. According to the 2012 Annual Survey of State Government 
Finances, total spending rose from $384.6 in 2007 to $485.6 billion in 2012, or 26.2 percent, 
while unemployment compensation expenses more than tripled, from $28.9 to $95.6 billion. 
[ibid]  Some states fared worse than others; from 2007 to 2012 spending on public welfare 
increased at a higher rate on average in Oregon (52.2 percent, from $3.8 billion to $5.8 billion) 
than in any other state, while Texas closely followed (51.3 percent, from $20.4 billion to $30.8 
billion).  Surely welfare programs that provide housing, food, and childcare are expensive, but 
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being thrifty in this case would result in homelessness, malnourishment, and worse.  Controlling 
public welfare costs is not easy, as aid takes the form of highly mobile, electronic transfer 
payments (e.g. a social security check, a debit card for groceries).  Moreover, high welfare 
payments can attract people from less generous regions, thereby increasing program participation 
and costs.  For these reasons the Federal Government provides much aid to SLGs for welfare, 
approximately 20 percent of total federal spending whereas education accounted for one 
percent.11 Indeed, the federal government takes most responsibility (and should do so for highly-
mobile capital) for public welfare through programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families that gives states a fixed block grant totaling $16.5 billion each year.12  The portion of 
low-income residents in a state is included in the formula used to provision federal grants.  A 
larger population of lower-income residents could mean a city or state is in fiscal distress, given 
a lower tax capacity and higher spending requirements.  Public welfare would pose a much more 
serious fiscal challenge for SLG without the federal government stands ready to support them.  
Certain types of federal grants require states to match funds for certain programs, like Medicaid.  
 Health care is another large, fast-growing budget item; according to NASBO’s 2013 State 
Expenditure Report, 19 percent of general fund expenditures went to Medicaid, growing across 
the nation at a compound rate of 4.1 percent from 2000-2012.13  Health care is particularly 
expensive in the United States and represents a large burden of debt for many Americans.  In 
2013 alone almost 2 million people defaulted on their unpaid medical bills, “making health care 
the No. 1 cause of such filings, and outpacing bankruptcies due to credit-card bills or unpaid 
mortgages.”14  SLGs are under much fiscal stress from rising health care costs strain resource 
allocation, especially those with large populations of lower-income residents, despite the federal 
government’s help through Medicare and Medicaid.  Indeed, many states are experiencing 
relatively high growth rates for Medicaid expenditure, which will surely compound into much 
fiscal strain on budgets as health care becomes a larger part of state budgets.  SLGs cannot 
individually manage healthcare costs by forgoing expansion, slashing payrolls, or cutting 
benefits, as the true solution involves transforming the U.S. health care system.15  
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Figure 4 - Public Spending on Transportation and Water Infrastructure 
 
While the few largest budget items for state and local governments - education, public 
welfare and health care - do not imminently jeopardize fiscal health, these expenditures are still 
growing quite fast relative to revenue sources.  Such trends in large expenditures result in more 
attention and resources being diverted from other important obligations.  So far much of this 
section has focused state and local government budget items in which spending has increased 
substantially.  Yet, there are important functions that have been deeply neglected, such as 
infrastructure. It is no secret that America’s infrastructure has been in decay, receiving a D+ 
rating from the American Society for Civil Engineers.   
SLGs have been neglecting their infrastructure, as Figure 4 shows prolonged stagnation 
in spending along with federal grants since the turn of the century.  Such negligence speaks to 
economic instability in the last decade.  State and local governments understand the condition of 
roads, bridges, schools, water and waste treatment plants, and other physical assets influences 
economic efficiency and growth.  Indeed, state and local governments own over 90 percent of 
non-defense public infrastructure assets.16  Alas, infrastructure projects fall in priority to more 
pressing budget concerns.  There is a huge tab - ASCE estimates $3.6 trillion of investment is 
needed by 2020 – and spending levels as a share of GDP have hit 30-year lows, as shown by 
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Figure 5.  Although neglecting infrastructure does not signal fiscal distress, it does reflect 
increasing short-termism and pressure on budgets.   
 
  
 
 Nonetheless, spending trends in education, public welfare, Medicaid, and infrastructure 
spending point to fiscal troubles, as vital state and local government functions are being 
neglected and becoming more expensive.  Even small economic shocks may become devastating 
as SLG budgets become increasingly fragile.  
  
Figure 5 - SLG Capital Spending as a share of GDP 
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Revenue 
SLGs must find additional revenue to finance their ever-increasing expenditures.  Typically the 
main sources of revenue for SLG are taxing property, income, and sales.  According to the 2013 
Annual Surveys of State and Local Government Finances, taxes represented on average 54 
percent of total general revenue for SLGs in the aggregate.  One form of tax may be more 
appropriate than another depending on the demographic and institutional structure of SLG.  
Progressive taxation, in which higher-income people pay higher taxes so as to redistribute 
income to lower quintiles, has long been a controversial topic regarding economic inequality.  
On the other hand, regressive taxation seeks to tax the broader population, thereby extracting 
more from lower-income people relative to the rich.  
Particularly southern states had imposed laws requiring a supermajority vote to change 
property taxes.  In efforts to balance budgets and restore fiscal health, states (Mississippi being 
the first in 1932) began to extract sales taxes.  Headlines read, “House Passes Bill to Insure 
Relief for Property Tax Payers.”17  Indeed, regressive taxation sparked class politics, labeled as 
another attempt by the wealthy to escape paying their fair share and passing the burden unto the 
poor.  Indeed, a recent trend for many states is the increase of sales taxes; two dozen cities and 
counties in Illinois did the same to fund infrastructure work.18  SLGs are usually hesitant to 
change property taxes in fear of businesses and landowners – important revenue sources – 
leaving.  They try hard to persuade companies to settle in their jurisdiction or negotiate with 
existing companies to stay so as to provide jobs and gain tax revenue, using property/income tax 
breaks as bargaining chips.  Instead, placing the tax at the bottom of receipts makes less noise.  
However, states concerned with keeping the level of poverty at a minimum should not look to 
increasing sales taxes as a budget solution, as the burden of the sales tax is heavier for lower-
income populations.19  Alas, the demand for more government spending surpasses the tolerance 
for higher taxes.  These sources of revenue are also cyclical in nature.   
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 Figure 6 reveals the volatile movement of taxes, as each source of revenue is affected by 
booms and busts.  Indeed, much of the deficit accumulated during the GFC was due to automatic 
stabilizers, mainly collapsing property tax revenue and ballooning welfare expenditures, but also 
due to falling sales tax revenue as household savings rates rose to service debt.  Such volatility in 
revenue surely places state and local governments in fiscal distress, considering their budget 
constraint as a currency user.  Government capital projects require fiscal planning and 
confidence in future revenue streams.  When tax revenue falls precipitously, state and local 
governments must rely on emergency funds and the benevolence of the Federal Government.  
Thus, SLGs have a hard time achieving fiscal stability, as they are subject to the whims of 
business cycles. Corporations (e.g. General Electric) have demonstrated they will move business 
operations elsewhere if terms with the state or local government are not to their liking.20  
Additionally, American jobs are easily exported in today’s global business landscape, thereby 
reducing tax capacity.   
Figure 6 - Percentage Movement of SLG Tax Revenue 
Source: Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finance 
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Summary 
Overall, revenues have shown to lag behind the growth of state and local government 
expenditure for education, welfare, healthcare and infrastructure.  Moreover, considering the 
limitations in changing and extracting taxes, revenue is pro-cyclical, thereby adding uncertainty 
to medium- and long-term government projects. Meanwhile, SLGs compete with one another to 
secure existing and new revenue streams by auctioning tax/economic incentives to corporations. 
The extent of these budget challenges suggests that SLGs are under fiscal distress.  Municipal 
finance is another source of funds available for SLGs, which allows them to avoid raising taxes 
or cutting spending immediately.  The next chapter will explore how SLGs practice municipal 
finance and the implications of such obligations.  There we find how increased financialization 
has put public funds at risk. 
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Chapter 3: State & Local Government Municipal Finance  
Debt is an attractive option for state and local governments looking for additional funds, 
given the limitations of other revenue sources, such as the political obstacles in raising taxes.  
However, debt comes with significant implications for SLG as currency users, that is the 
requirement to find revenue to service the debt.   We must keep in mind that the ability of a SLG 
to fulfill debt obligations depends on their revenue capacity, since they cannot issue their own 
currency.   This chapter begins with a look at the different debt instruments available for SLGs, 
and how credit has become increasingly important for budget relief.  Moreover, the financial 
instability of SLGs will be evaluated, which we find to largely be the fault of predatory behavior 
from Wall Street banks, right now the main source of credit for SLG. 
Municipal Bonds 
Issuing bonds is an appropriate source of funding for long-term capital projects, as SLG 
contractors are paid over a number of years for projects that will mainly benefit future 
generations. Municipal bonds are also attractive to high net-worth individuals seeking tax-
exemptions. For example, some investors have been willing to accept interest payments of about 
2 percentage points lower than different bond classes on the current tax exemption offered by 
Minneapolis municipal bonds.21  Another demand factor is the credit rating of a particular SLG.   
Credit risk is often evaluated using the ratings produced by private companies (e.g. Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor), which were found to be fraudulent in the wake of the GFC.  Again, 
considering the budget limitations of SLGs, municipal bonds are not default-proof.  Thus, a 
scenario like the one (wrongly) predicted by Meredith Whitney could occur.22 Investor faith also 
depends on the expectation of the federal government intervening when SLG solvency is 
threatened to recover bond payments.  
There are limits to debt issuance, as politicians have an incentive to issue far too much 
because it allows spending without the political constraint of having to tax current voters.  From 
the taxpayer's perspective, debt financing should be limited to long-term capital projects that will 
provide benefits across generations. An important implication of SLG debt is that, “Either under 
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standard practice or as required by law or ordinance, debt service most often must be paid first 
before covering all other expenses of state and municipal governments.”23  Taxpayers are below 
bondholders and other creditors in the capital structure, hence they are usually left most of the 
financial burden should troubles arise in a state or local government’s ability to meet its debt 
obligations.   
 
SLGs have become increasingly burdened by debt, as the total amount of municipal 
bonds is approaching $4 trillion in size. [sifma.org/research/statistics]  Figure 7 shows more SLG 
revenue is going towards servicing debt in the last decade, which means less spending for 
community development, less income for public employees, and more retirement anxiety.  Many 
SLG are still overwhelmed by the large amounts of debt undertaken during and after the Global 
Financial Crisis.  From 2012-2013, Texas had the largest rate of increase in state and local 
government outstanding debt, from $186.7 billion to $270.7 billion (45.0 percent), meanwhile 
debt rose in the District of Columbia and every state except for Alaska and Montana. [ibid]  It is 
Figure 7 - SLG Municipal Finance 
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worth noting that debt service ratios tend to rise sharply during economic crises due to a 
combination of collapsed revenue and more debt.  Most of this debt is in the form of SLG bonds 
outstanding, although bonds are not the only form of SLG debt owed. The majority of states limit 
general obligation bonds, a standard financial tool for the public, to either an absolute number or 
relative to income, current revenues or the general fund.   
 
Pension Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An immense pool of resources, total pension obligations across the United States 
exceeded $3.79 trillion in FY 2014, representing over 20 percent of GDP that same year.  Public 
pensions are threatened to the extent that their assets are unable to meet future liabilities at a 
discount rate without either huge investment returns or cash injections. When pension funds 
experience falling returns or stagnating revenue while liquidity needs increase as a result of 
future retirements, state and local governments may not be able to continue contributing enough.  
They may also feel pressured to invite risk to improve the yields of investment portfolios and 
find their way out of the financial crisis.  
Figure 8 - Pension Funding Ratios by State 
Source: US Census Bureau  
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Figure 8 shows us that employee contributions to both state and local government 
pension funds have stagnated for the past decade, which speaks to how real wage growth 
(income revenue growth) has remained flat.  On the other hand, state and local government 
contributions have risen since the passing of the GFC, giving the impression of recovery, yet it is 
not so clear that such a trend indicates fiscal health. Many states pension funding ratios fell 
below 80 percent, suggesting that pension funds are being squeezed.24  Indeed, the state pensions 
with the lowest funding ratios (i.e. CT, NJ, IL, KY) have been recently facing fiscal distress.  
Connecticut has recently watched General Electric leave and is currently facing a $266 million 
shortfall for fiscal 2016; it is even trying to tax Yale’s endowment for additional revenue.25  
According to census accounting conventions, unfunded retirement obligations are not 
included in the total debt reported by state and local governments. Surely public employees 
expect their full payout from the government, so states must have stable income to meet such 
scheduled obligations.  Unlike the case for Social Security, a federal program, state and local 
government pension funds cannot always pay any bill when it comes due.  Subsector 
governments cannot consistently tolerate lackluster investment returns, nor continually fail to 
make required contributions, or else fund solvency and credibility are threatened.   Pension 
contributions must continue grow in order to fill the large funding gap.  Under current 
accounting standards used by public pension funds, the total value of unfunded liabilities is 
calculated by discounting total liabilities using the assumed return on the investments held by the 
plan.  Based on this method, “state and local plans today are about 74 percent funded and have 
unfunded liabilities of about $1.4 trillion.”26  However, corporate pension plans are not allowed 
to discount their liabilities using an assumed return on investment, nor can most public employee 
pensions in other countries. If state and local government pension plans were to change their 
method according to the recommendations of the Actuarial Standards Board, which discounts the 
plan’s future benefit payments using the interest rate from a risk-free investment (e.g. Treasury 
bonds), the total value of unfunded liabilities would be closer to $5 trillion, with funding ratios of 
just 39 percent.  Thus, pension funding may be in worse shape than SLGs tend to report.  
Meanwhile, employee retirement revenue collapsed (dropping 67.7 percent, from $533.3 
billion to $172.0 billion) alongside interest earnings (falling 44.6 percent, from $91.9 billion to 
$50.9 billion).27  Many cities and wealthy towns throughout New York, such as Southampton, 
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East Hampton, Nassau and Suffolk, and major public employers like the Westchester Medical 
Center and the New York Public Library, “...are all managing their rising pension bills by 
borrowing from the very same $140 billion pension fund to which they owe money.”28  
Essentially, New York’s borrowing plan allows public employers to reduce their short-term 
pension contributions in return for higher payments later on.  The eagerness to borrow on behalf 
of state and local governments speaks to their struggle in meeting pension obligations.  However, 
using debt as a budgetary sleight-of-hand is not wise and threatens the long-term solvency of 
these funds, especially if a state is betting that the performance of financial markets will improve 
later on to the extent required to ease funding concerns. 
Unfunded liabilities have become a significant share of gross state product (GSP), 
exceeding 10 percent in Mississippi, Kentucky and Illinois.  Plenty of states are behind on 
funding levels, as only Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee paid their actuarially required 
contribution in FY 2010, meanwhile Kentucky contributed only 58 percent of what was 
necessary. Illinois, Missouri and Kentucky all contributed less than what was required for the 
majority of the past 14 years.  Therefore, if rates of return are lesser than what was assumed, due 
to either market corrections or recessions, the amount of unfunded liabilities may increase.  For 
example, CalPERS reported a meager 0.6% total investment return for the 2015-2016 fiscal year, 
compared to its return assumption of 7.5%.  Not only is CalPER’s assumption rate abnormally 
high, especially considering the low-rate environment maintained by central banks across the 
globe, they have also tried to mislead their beneficiaries (and taxpayers) about its investment 
returns by selectively reporting performance so as to maintain appearances.29 
The St. Louis Federal Reserve bank recognizes the recent investment landscape has been 
characterized by exceptionally low returns on investment (ROI).  At the trough of the GFC in FY 
2009, median investment returns across public pension systems was –19.1 percent, surely putting 
a large dent into investment strategies and portfolios.  The Illinois State Employees' Retirement 
System (SERS) only yielded 3.1 percent over the five-year period ending in FY 2011, whereas it 
had assumed a noble rate of return of 7.75 percent over the same period (most public pension 
systems used to assume an 8 percent rate of return on investments). Since around 80 percent of 
aggregate public pension revenue in FY 2011 came from investment returns, lowering return 
assumptions will significantly increase estimates of unfunded liabilities.30  More than two-thirds 
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of state retirement systems have been cutting ROI assumptions to their lowest levels since the 
1980s, “a shift that portends greater hardships for employees and cash-strapped governments as 
Americans age.”  Even slight cuts to ROI assumptions results in workers being asked to pay 
significantly more for retirement; according to Jean-Pierre Aubry, assistant director at the Center 
for Retirement Research at Boston College, a drop of one percentage point in the assumed rate of 
return may boost pension liabilities by 12 percentage points.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 - State Government Credit Rating 2001-2014 
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Plan sponsors are concerned by new pension reporting rules mandated by the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board's (GASB) Statement No. 68. Since June 15 2014, 
state and local balance sheets have been required to reflect unfunded pension liabilities, moving 
such information from the footnotes to the forefront.  Looming solvency threats may do damage 
to a state's credit rating, therefore quick action (or creative budgeting) is necessary to prevent 
credit degradation.   Illinois has faced several credit downgrades over the past six years, mainly 
due to their underfunded pension system. Standard & Poor's credit analyst Robin Prunty 
commented at the time Illinois fell to A- in 2013, “the downgrade reflects what we view as the 
state's weakened pension funded ratios and lack of action on reform measures intended to 
improve funding levels and diminish cost pressures associated with annual contributions."33  
Illinois took another hit in October 2015 when its credit rating fell one notch to BBB+. Granted, 
the poor performance of Illinois’ fiscal and pension affairs is not representative of the rest of the 
United States.  To the contrary of other fiscal health indicators, Figure 9 shows many states have 
top-notch credit ratings, suggesting they are not in danger of insolvency.  Missouri, North 
Carolina, and Virginia are the three states that have held their AAA credit rating for 50 years or 
more, in the meantime withstanding several crises. In 2013, North Dakota and Texas joined the 
AAA club thanks to oil revenue, whereas in the next year New Jersey was downgraded from 
AA- to A+. Nonetheless, no state is impervious to the dangers that arise from out-of-control 
pension obligations and credit degradation. 
 One strategy for fiscally distressed states has been to issue more municipal bonds Pension 
obligation bonds (POB) allow states to use credit instead of their own funds to cover their 
unfunded liabilities.  The state government issuing the POB will not have to contribute their own 
to cover unfunded liabilities so long as they are able to earn a rate of return on their investments 
that is higher than the interest rate of the bond.  However, often times the return on investment 
(ROI) falls short of expectations, thereby leaving SLG exposed.  A 2010 study by the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College found that most POBs issued in the previous decade had 
negative yields, while only the POBs issued before 1996 or during “dramatic stock market 
downturns” had positive returns.33  Thus, it seems the POBs were not as useful and safe as the 
banks claimed them to be. Illinois already pays a hefty market penalty on their $26.5 billion 
outstanding municipal bonds for its fiscal woes.  Therefore, any changes to interest rates or 
further credit degradations could put the state in crisis.   
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 Concerns are grounded in the fear of spending cuts to service debt.  For example, in 
2010, local government leaders in California announced a statewide petition concerned with the 
state government diverting or borrowing money from the local government public transit funds, 
as the director of the League of California Cities notes, “...continued state raids and borrowing of 
local government funds have put these vital local services at risk.”34  Moreover, excessive debt 
issuance can actually cause state revenue to fall, as the total amount of tax exemptions increase.  
Beside these fears associated with debt, SLGs are also vulnerable to exploitative financial 
practices in dealing mainly with Wall Street firms.  
Predatory Private Finance 
Wall Street has much to gain from state and local government borrowing, taking the role 
of deal mediators and financial specialists.  SLG capital investment today is minimal despite the 
low-rate environment of the last decade, which makes credit cheaper.  It seems they are reluctant 
to ramp up spending on aging roads, bridges and buildings, despite the favorable interest rates. 
According to an article in The Wall Street Journal, “New government-bond issues have dropped 
to levels not seen in the past 20 years.”  The total value of municipal bonds issued for new 
projects last year is about $140 billion, which is 53% lower than in 2006 and 21% lower than in 
1996. So far this year municipal borrowing is up to about $95 billion, slightly higher than at this 
time last year.  Despite the resounding notion from mainstream media that the U.S. economy has 
recovered, SLG currently hold about the same amount of debt as they had when they emerged 
from the recession, largely due to stagnant revenue growth, and therefore must cut back spending 
and investment so as to keep their financial liabilities under control.  According to The National 
Association of State Budget Officers, state spending will rise by 2.5 percent in fiscal 2017, down 
from 5.5 percent this year.35 
To be sure, SLGs are not cutting back on new bond issues because their economies are 
flourishing, or because they’ve run out of new project ideas.  Rather, it seems more likely that 
SLGs are scarred by both the large budget cuts they endured at the height of the GFC and their 
stagnant revenue growth coupled with rising costs.  In May this year, transportation officials in 
California announced a 28 percent cut to construction plans from now until 2021.  Meanwhile, 
officials in Florida went 5 years without approving any new borrowing for the state’s main 
construction program, which entails a long list of projects for public schools and universities, and 
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effectively limited new debt from $1.4 billion in 2007 down to $275 million. According to a 
study by McKinsey Global Institute released in June, the U.S. must increase infrastructure 
spending by 0.7% of GDP between now and 2030 to meet its transportation, water, power and 
telecommunications infrastructure needs. So far, rather than investing in maintaining 
infrastructure and capital projects, SLG have been preoccupied with underfunded employee 
pensions and other budget shortfalls.  Moreover, SLG are receiving fewer federal grants for 
capital investment; grants for 2016 are expected to total less than $68 billion, down from $90 
billion in the aftermath of the GFC.  [ibid] 
Failed Infrastructure Deals 
A few recent infrastructure deals have even been rejected by communities; the North 
Carolina House of Representatives recently passed a bill to cancel a 50-year toll road contract. 
The residents of North Carolina did not want, “...to pay tolls to commute to work when residents 
in southern suburbs have access to more free lanes built when the state had more funding 
available for highways.”36 Private parties behind such infrastructure projects try to extract more 
return from SLG bonds, since the money from tolls would be used to pay the bonds.  North 
Carolina in this case does not have an easy way out of this bad deal, which has yet to the state’s 
senate.  If they choose to cancel the deal now they must pay a $250 million dollar fee to 
bondholders according to the cancellation clauses.  Those who back the bill to cancel the 
infrastructure project admitted they plan to delay other projects delayed so as to defray the cost.   
Otherwise, the North Carolina will have to ignore their residents’ objections and go 
through with the deal, which will likely go bankrupt, as virtually all private toll firms have done.  
There is reason to believe that investors behind such deals for toll road contracts have little 
interest in the project’s success, since the federal government generally guarantees the bonds.  
However, the guarantees often protect bondholders rather than the residents, 
...if and when the private toll road or tunnel partner goes bankrupt, taxpayers are forced to pay off the 
bonds while absorbing all loans the state and federal governments gave the private shell company and any 
accumulated depreciation. Yet the shell company’s parent firms get to keep years of actual toll income, on 
top of millions in design-build cost overruns…37 
North Carolina is not the only case of a failed public/private infrastructure partnership.  Often 
times the traffic projections for road projects by private firms are vastly overestimated, “A 2006 
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study of 26 American P3 toll facilities found that "the average overestimate of revenues for each 
toll road for each year of the first five years of operation was 109 percent – more than double 
actual revenues." (Truthout.org)  For example, Aecom and ARUP were tasked with projecting 
traffic for a highway project in Australia received several complaints from bondholders; Aecom 
projected vehicle traffic would double to approximately 100,000 vehicles per day when the 
project changed the free public road to a public-private toll way. In reality the actual annual toll 
income was $7.5 million, as opposed to ARUP’s projection of $107 million.  
Sometimes state infrastructure projects fail over things completely out of the SLG’s 
control.  At first, the $3.8 billion public-private highway contract given to Indiana Toll Road 
Concession Company in 2005 seemed promising for both the state and the private sector, 
especially considering the 75-year timespan of the deal.  The company was given the 
responsibility to manage the state-owned highway, and in return was allowed to keep the 
collected tolls.  During the GFC, traffic volumes in Indiana fell and the company’s debt almost 
doubled to $6 billion after eight years, until it finally went bankrupt in 2014.38  It seems nearly 
impossible for such long-term infrastructure projects to succeed if there is another economic 
crisis every decade or so.  State and local governments need financial stability to ensure the work 
on such projects continues.  Such situations are burdensome for both parties struggling during 
economic crises.   
 Then, in May 2016 CalPERS announced its 10 percent stake in the Indiana Toll Road 
Concession, as the fund’s first purchase in U.S. transportation as part of a new program focused 
on infrastructure investments.  Unions are understandably concerned with how their retirement 
savings are invested, and have long fought public-private partnerships inviting profit-driven 
firms with cost-cutting plans that hurt quality and compromise the safety.  The fund is essentially 
investing in a business that has a horrible track record and relies on speculation of economic and 
traffic conditions.  Moreover, CalPERS is a new investor in the transportation sector, where no 
American private toll firms are still in operation under the same management.  To be clear, the 
fund is not investing in new construction, rather in a restructuring of a deal gone bad.  
Nonetheless, the 10 percent stake in the toll road company is a risky investment that may have 
negative consequences or employees’ retirement savings.   
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Despite there being laws that limit state debt issuance, the financial sector finds a way to 
suck more revenue from public coffers.  Since SLG are now reluctant to issue more new debt, 
private firms have changed their profit strategy.  Instead of extracting interest from municipal 
debt, private financial firms have begun charging more fees for their services and products. Such 
a shift in the source of profits for financial firms has significant implications for capital projects 
and pension funds.  The Public Banking Institute’s What Wall Street Costs America project 
estimates the total level of fees charged by Wall Street across all 50 states to be around $4 
trillion.  New Jersey has been hit particularly hard, paying about $701 million in fees to Wall 
Street banks in 2015 alone.  Not only are states paying service and transaction fees to Wall 
Street, they are also paying termination fees to exit from complicated investment arrangements, 
such as interest rate swaps.39  The old-fashioned way SLG used to finance their project was to 
sell standard fixed-rate debt, like 30-year bonds.  Starting in the 1990s and intensifying in the 
early 2000s, Wall Street banks convinced SLG to use other, more complicated financial 
instruments that would supposedly save governments millions of dollars while hedging risk.   
Interest Rate Swaps 
In addition to extending credit, private banks also offer SLGs financial products like 
interest rate swaps.  Many states, municipalities, and school districts have found themselves 
stuck in bad investments made with Wall Street firms, wishing they had stuck with simplicity.  
Since 2005, the cost of the NJ’s banking fees ballooned from $10 million to $600 million in 
2014, and $701 million in 2015.  Under Governor Chris Christie, New Jersey is paying banks 
$720 million to terminate $4.2 billion of interest rate swaps, which are essentially bets on future 
interest rate movements pitched to municipal borrowers as a way to protect against rising interest 
rates on variable-rate bonds.40  The municipality ultimately enters into an agreement with Wall 
Street firms to swap payments of the floating-rate with payments of the fixed-rate. First the 
government would issue variable-rate bonds to then be combined with bond insurance, for which 
they would pay dealers an annual fee.   
However, a closer look at the contracts reveal numerous risks for the borrower, such as 
termination risk, basis risk, counterparty risk, and credit risk.  When it finally came time to swap 
the rates, the banks usually would pay an amount according to a bond index rather than the actual 
cost of the government’s new floating-rate debt; such discrepancies become significant in long-
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term contracts.  NJ treasury spokesman Christopher Santarelli admits, "These derivatives of over 
$4 billion have been considered to be toxic by market participants and the administration," in 
other words a large, unpredictable liquidity risk on its books. [ibid]  Termination clauses help to 
guarantee income for Wall Street investors, thereby limiting their downside in the swap deal 
while keeping all of the upside.  Even worse, such clauses are usually prompted when SLG fall 
under fiscal distress, thereby compounding financial trouble.  
Detroit is another victim of Wall Street’s interest rate swaps, as the city was persuaded to 
hedge interest-rate risk on some of the $1.45 billion of pension debt Detroit right before the 
GFC.  When interest rates did not rise like Detroit had bet on, the city was faced with significant 
financial trouble as their deal with Wall Street turned sour. In December 2013, Detroit paid UBS 
AG and Bank of America Corp’s Merrill Lynch Capital Services a total of $85 million, plus up 
to $4.2 million in costs, to end the interest-rate swaps, which is actually much less than what was 
originally proposed.  Moreover, Detroit received a $285 million loan from Barclays PLC, 
partially to pay the termination and legal fees, while $120 million of the loan would be used to 
improve city services, thus adding to their $18.5 billion of debt at the time.41  In this case, the 
banks also demanded to be protected against any downsides.  Naturally, the banks used a 
complicated formula to determine the value of the contract if terminated before the end of 30 
years, known as the “termination payment.”42 Depending on how early the SLG would seek to 
cancel the deal, the termination payment could turn out to be tremendous.  Despite their size, 
these payments have gone mostly unnoticed, as they are simply hidden inside other bond issues 
that convert the swaps back to the basic deals the governments should have done in the first 
place. Mistakes are simply refinanced in the municipal market; In 2014, Detroit filed for 
bankruptcy due to fiscal distress, as public officials panicked to restructure the budget.  When 
worse came to worst, the first to receive payments were Wall Street banks.43 
Even though SLGs often hire municipal advisors to help negotiate with the banks, such 
professionals were unregulated and unlicensed until the Dodd-Frank Act reforms, able to access 
information only through the bankers (who often recommend advisors for the job).  Many 
advisors and bankers convinced governments that suing a bank is unwise, else the bankers would 
punish governments by driving up the costs of future deals; they scared governments with the 
threat of refusing to sell their bonds or to make markets.  For example, Kevyn Orr, Detroit’s 
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state-appointed emergency manager, was reluctant to force its terms on the creditors who object 
to the city’s debt restructuring, as doing so might risk the loss of $816 million pledged by 
philanthropic foundations and the state of Michigan to ease retiree pension cuts.  [ibid]  SLGs are 
somewhat protected from such exploitation by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
“fair dealing” rule, which requires that, “...in the conduct of their municipal advisory activities, 
municipal advisors must deal fairly with all persons and not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, 
or unfair practice.”44  However, a city cannot solely enforce the fair dealing rule, not to mention 
that regulators often failed to persecute large financial firms for criminal behavior.45 
Nonetheless, the banks have the upper hand in these deals, allowing them to establish favorable 
clauses at the expense of the SLG.   
 Not only did Wall Street cost SLGs hundreds of millions of dollars, but many poor 
households also suffered by being denied public services to help repay municipal debt.  In 2014, 
Detroit became the first major American city to enact mass water shutoffs, affecting some 46,000 
poor households who could not afford the sharp price hikes in their water bills in recent years.  
City residents’ delinquent water bills were not the main cause of fiscal distress, especially when 
compared to the fees and penalties paid to Wall Street Banks.  Indeed, interest rate swaps along 
with other complex financial instruments were a large contributing factor in Detroit’s financial 
crisis, as the Detroit Water and Sewage Department had to borrow $537 million in 2012 to pay 
termination penalties to banks on water swap contracts.  Such predatory finance is part of the 
reason why Detroit has hiked rates on water bills by nearly 120 percent in the last decade, 
whereby almost half of that revenue now goes toward servicing debt.  Punishing residents, 
around 40 percent of which live below the poverty in Detroit, through water price hikes instead 
of Wall Street con men is wrongheaded. The crisis in Detroit is part of a much larger systemic 
problem, as other nearby SLG have experienced similar exploitation.46   
About 1,600 Baltimore homes had their water shut off by May last year, which is an 
expected result when the residents had to endure a 42 percent rate hike in the three previous 
years alone.  Rudy Chow, the director of Baltimore’s Department of Public Works, tried to 
justify the rate hikes by noting the $40 million in delinquent bills.  The damage Wall Street 
banks have done to Baltimore far outweighs that of the delinquent water bills.  A closer look at 
Baltimore’s finances reveals the city had paid much more than $40 million to Wall Street to 
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escape toxic deals regarding interest rate swaps. Federal support for infrastructure in Baltimore 
had been diminishing, along with city revenue, leaving the city with a tight budget.  Baltimore’s 
officials, led by mayor Martin O’Malley in 2002, signed on the deal with prospects for saving 
money on water, sewer and other projects, and much like the officials in New Jersey and Detroit 
they later realized it was a financial trap.  The huge risks associated with these financial deals 
were revealed when the GFC hit, whereby states and cities across the U.S. became over indebted 
to Wall Street banks.  Of course, the banks had secured their position by writing termination 
clauses into the contracts, leaving SLGs fiscally distressed with large, unnecessary financial 
liabilities (i.e. interest rate swaps and variable-rate bonds) and high penalties.  By mid-2015, the 
total cost for all of Baltimore’s interest rate swaps approached $200 million ($43 million in 
penalties and $56 million in interest payments alone for water and wastewater swaps), not 
including the huge losses on the city’s auction rate securities – essentially variable-rate bonds 
that reset interest rates every specified period.  Despite less than 38 percent of the delinquent 
water bills belonging to residential accounts, the city shut off water to over 3,000 households, 
typically the poorest residents in the area, leaving them to pay Wall Street’s bill.  On the other 
hand, only two businesses had their water shut off, making it clear that Baltimore punished 
residents for a crisis that was by no means their fault, while the financial perpetrators got to walk 
away. [ibid] 
Yet another municipality, Jefferson County in Alabama, fell victim to Wall Street’s 
predatory financial products.  Like the other SLGs during the GFC, Jefferson County’s tax 
revenues collapsed, meanwhile their liabilities grew out of control thanks to the interest rate 
swaps and other derivatives provided by Wall Street to finance a sewer project. Matt Taibbi 
describes the dealings as, “… A mob of corrupt local officials and morally absent financiers got 
together to build a giant device that converted human shit into billions of dollars of profit for 
Wall Street…”  The finance director of Jefferson County was given the power to raise sewer 
rates, so as to reassure creditors that the debt will be repaid.  In 1996, the average monthly sewer 
bill for a family of four in Birmingham was only $14.71, until such deals with financial wizards 
on Wall Street resulted in sewage bills as high as $64 per month (an increase of about 400 
percent over a few years), a large burden for poor communities on top of the other hardships 
during the GFC.  However, County officials realized they could not continue to raise rates lest 
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they anger voters, so they went to Wall Street banks looking for financial products to help 
“reduce” mounting interest, that is, interest rate swaps.47   
Like the other aforementioned victims, Wall Street firms changed Jefferson County’s 
municipal bonds from a fixed rate to an adjustable rate, and then, for a large fee, swapped 
interest rate payments so as to “protect” the County from ballooning interest rates.  The leader in 
the swap deals was JPMorgan Chase & Co., one of the largest U.S. banks.  According to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the bank led underwriters in the transactions and 
provided $5.6 billion in related derivatives.  When the GFC hit, the insurance companies that 
were underwriting the County’s debt had gone belly up, thus triggering clauses in the swap 
contracts that required payments of over $800 million in just four years, while annual debt 
payments spiked from $53 billion to $636 million.  The County defaulted on about $3.1 billion 
securities backed by sewer revenue in November 2011, marking the biggest municipal 
bankruptcy on record.  JPMorgan did not want the County to file for bankruptcy, since 
alternatives would have provided more profits for the bank, such as refinancing, which requires 
the unraveling of the toxic swaps.  Nonetheless, the GFC made the municipal bonds more 
expensive and required early repayments well beyond Jefferson County’s affordability, while the 
interest-rate swaps provided no protection. [ibid]     
Why did these deals fail to protect SLGs?  The swaps were supposed to offer SLG 
protection against spikes in interest rates, as the borrower, who has exposure to a floating interest 
rate, pays a fixed rate of interest while the counterparty pays a floating rate based on a principal 
amount.  Wall Street firms convinced SLG that interest rates were going to rise and offered these 
swaps to offset such risks, since higher interest rates means higher debt servicing costs for SLG.  
Although interest rates did rise leading up to the GFC, they were then slashed immediately, 
thereby leaving SLGs to pay relatively high interest rates on their bonds.  The only way SLGs 
could take advantage of the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) set forth by the Fed was to pay more 
penalties to Wall Street firms so as to refinance their outstanding bonds.  In September 2014, 
Chicago paid a $36 million penalty to terminate an interest rate swap so that it could refinance 
the underlying debt at a lower rate.  In fact, the precipitous fall in interest rates caused the 
termination penalties on these swap deals to rise tremendously, which goes to show how well the 
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banks protected themselves in these deals, while trying to extract as much as possible from 
governments regardless of the public welfare and economic outcomes.  
The swaps only provide protection if the two variable rates - the rate you pay to 
bondholders versus the rate you receive from the bank - are equal, which was not the case in 
many of the aforementioned deals.  However, in the swap contracts, rather than match the 
interest rate SLGs had to pay to bondholders, the banks instead paid the municipalities a lesser 
rate tied to the London Interbank Exchange Rate (LIBOR).  When it came time to swap interest 
rates, Jefferson County received much less than from JPMorgan than what it owed to 
bondholders, making the swaps completely ineffective.  Keep in mind that since several major 
global banks have paid hundreds of billions of dollars in fines to the SEC for cases in which they 
were caught manipulating the LIBOR.  After the GFC, public officials in Baltimore and several 
other cities filed a lawsuit against the major banks involved in the city’s liability of hundreds of 
millions of dollars in interest-rate swaps and adjustable rate bonds connected to LIBOR.48  
Names of major banks included Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, HSBC Bank, 
Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse, all of whom the city claims had under-reported rates, thus 
allowing them to pay less on the interest rate swaps held by several SLGs.49   
In 1997, the United Kingdom prohibited local governments from investing in interest rate 
swaps and other derivatives, which were seen by the Parliament as having an unlawful stigma.  
Back in the 1980s, several municipal authorities (e.g. Hammersmith & Fulham) speculated on 
interest rates using swaps, until the state intervened and deemed such activities to be outside the 
municipality’s jurisdiction and unenforceable by banks involved. The U.K. understood that such 
activities were too risky for local governments, who are vulnerable to economic shocks. Local 
governments often misunderstand the risk elements involved when dealing with derivatives.  
Even the lawyer who advised Jefferson County officials on bond sales admitted he could not 
understand the math on the interest rate swaps, “Neither I nor anybody in the Jefferson County 
Commission -- or for that matter, I’m not even sure that the JPMorgan people we deal with -- 
really understand how swaps are priced in the global financial market.” [ibid] Indeed, municipal 
borrowers did not understand the risk of the bond auctions failing. 
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Capital Appreciation Bonds 
Another municipal financial instrument is the capital appreciation bond (CAB), which 
similar to a zero-coupon bond in that the principle and the interest of the loan are paid in one 
lump sum on the bond's maturity date (or at a specified time).  These long-term bonds have 
compounding interest, thereby SLG are left with large outstanding liabilities grows sharply as 
unpaid interest accumulates.  CABS have left schools districts in particular with large financial 
burdens.  For example, the $105 million in CABs issued by Poway Unified School District in 
San Diego County promise to pay a total of $877 million in interest over 40 years (about 
835%).50  The West Contra Costa School District near San Francisco has $2.5 million CABs 
outstanding that promise to pay $34 million in interest, or 1,360%.51  Essentially, these districts 
are betting on economic conditions improving in the next decades, making these long-term 
financing deals significantly risky considering the unstable nature of the U.S. economy.  In 2012, 
according to data collected by the Los Angeles Times, school districts across California had 
borrowed nearly $3 billion using CAB to finance capital projects, maintenance and materials.  In 
total the bonds promise to pay over $16 billion to creditors, while most limit the ability to 
refinance.52  Since then, California state officials have discouraged the use of CABs.   
California’s Treasurer, Bill Lockyer, likens CABs to the toxic financial products that 
were significant factors in the GFC.  He notes, "[Wall Street] has done this kind of thing on the 
private investor side for years, then the housing market and now its public entities." [ibid]  The 
compound interest on these long-term bonds makes them many times more expensive, in some 
cases to as much as 10 or 20 times the principle.  Ultimately, the financial burden of such deals 
falls on taxpayers and poor communities if the government cannot repay the loans; local districts 
contribute about 80% of the funds for school construction projects, while the state usually 
contributes the other 20%, with little to no role by the federal government.  Much of the burden 
falls disproportionately on low-income, rural school districts, as those with less taxable wealth 
are often hit with higher fees and thereby receive less for their education dollars.  In 2014, the 
state of New York decided to expand pre-K education by spending about $1.5 billion over the 
next five years, while school districts across the nation pay double that amount ($3-4 billion) 
every year on fees alone to Wall Street firms. [ibid]   
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Our school districts should not be subject to predatory financial practices, especially 
since they have been recently forced to slash teacher salaries, arts programs, and other 
meaningful services.  Such important public services must be protected from financial 
exploitation if we want stability and prosperity for future generations.  SLGs rely on municipal 
finance for capital development and sometimes as an alternative to raising taxes/cutting 
spending.  Predatory municipal finance can have real consequences for communities, such as 
Baltimore and Detroit shutting off water for thousands of residents.   
Indeed, Wall Street banks do not seem to care if their financial “services” negatively 
impact SLGs and taxpayers, so long as they can craft the contracts and products in a way that 
minimizes their losses.  An alternative for municipal finance is needed to Wall Street banks. 
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Chapter 4: Public Banking as an Alternative 
Currently, the only option for most SLGs to engage in municipal finance is through 
private banks and financial firms that seek profits for their shareholders and to maintain 
solvency.  These financial institutions have been known to use fraud as a business model, and are 
not so much interested in the public good, as the nature of their services is to prioritize private 
profits for shareholders.53  SLGs have paid unnecessarily high amounts for financial services; the 
cities of New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago do nearly $600 billion of business (including 
pension funds) with Wall Street every year, with LA having spent more than twice as much on 
banking fees than street services in FY 2013.54  As explained in aforementioned examples, big 
private banks in some cases have put SLG public funds at risk of excessive debt. 
 
Figure 10 – Share of Total Domestic Deposits Held by Small Banks vs. Large Banks, 
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Figure 10 reveals that private banking is dominant in the United States, as a select few 
banks control the majority of assets, in part due to the deregulation of the financial sector along 
with numerous mergers and acquisitions in recent decades.  The five largest banks in Q4 2014 
held 46 percent of US banking assets, an increase of 28 percent from Q1 2000, while small 
banks’ share of US banking assets has fell from 30 to 18 percent.55  Alas, SLGs usually turn to 
such large financial institutions for municipal finance instead of smaller banks.   
 Moreover, there is no established medium for public financial officials in SLGs to apply 
collective bargaining practices against Wall Street in negotiating municipal finance deals.  
Finance staff can be hesitant, sometimes even obstructionist, in efforts to lower banking fees.  
There have been many instances in which public officials were found to be in cahoots with the 
private banks, not to mention many such individuals have been or will be employed by Wall 
Street.  Some public officials have taken stands against Wall Street, such as the Board of 
Supervisors of Santa Cruz County in California, who voted last year to refuse any new business 
with banks convicted of felonies for the next five years.  A more effective mechanism for SLGs 
to take a stand against financial exploitation would be to establish a public bank. 
 While the private banking model seeks profit for certain shareholders, the public banking 
model would see that the wealth they generate is reinvested in the community.  This chapter will 
discuss some past and current forms of public banking, identify ways in which public banks can 
benefit SLGs and their communities, and end with thoughts on where and how public banks can 
be instituted in the United States.   
Case Study: Bank of North Dakota 
Only one state-owned bank currently exists in the United States - the Bank of North 
Dakota (BND).  Legally, the state of North Dakota is doing business as the BND, requiring state 
funds to be placed in the bank, with a mission “To deliver quality, sound financial services that 
promote agriculture, commerce and industry in North Dakota.” (https://bnd.nd.gov/mission/)    
The BND was founded in July 1919, and has since served as a tool for the state to 
appropriate funds when needed through the budget process or state law. Its founding came after 
an economic recession sparked anti-big-bank and anti-big-business sentiment.  The major 
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proponents were farmers whose incomes had been suppressed due to exploitative practices of 
rentiers both in- and out-of-state, eventually developing a populist movement that pressured 
public institutions to support agriculture.  Today the BND is under the oversight of the Industrial 
Commission of North Dakota, which is composed of the governor, the attorney general, and the 
agricultural commissioner.  The BND is also subject to an independent audit annually, while 
virtually their entire budget is controlled by the state legislature.  Such checks to power were 
thoughtfully incorporated into the BND’s legal structure so as to give SLG government 
taxpayers a mechanism to defend themselves from usurious and fraudulent behavior from 
powerful private financial institutions.  It is worth mentioning the financial process regarding the 
bank’s inception; the $2 million of municipal bonds issued by ND proved to be inadequate 
several years later, then prompting the public sequestration of funds from banks in western North 
Dakota, followed by 18 bank failures in the following three weeks.   So as to not drive out small 
local banks, the BND was restricted from opening branches, engaging in retail banking, or 
focusing on commercial lending instead of farm real estate loans.  Some barriers to retail banking 
were removed over time, as the BND was allowed to offer basic checking and savings accounts 
and other retail banking services (e.g. tax-deferred savings, certificates of deposit, foreign 
exchange) to North Dakota residents, though not certain products such as ATM cards, debit 
cards, credit cards or online bill pay.  Moreover, the BND operates only in Bismarck, leaving 
plenty of room for private banks.56    
Specifically, the operating policy directs the Bank to be “helpful to and to assist in the 
development of state and national banks and other financial institutions and public corporations 
within the state and not, in any manner, to destroy or to be harmful to existing financial 
institutions.”  Indeed, the public bank has been very useful for the state’s financial and economic 
needs, especially during crises and panics.  During times as desperate as the Great Depression, 
the BND facilitated the state’s public payroll, exchanging teachers’ warrants for pay in full 
whereas cashing them elsewhere would have returned 15 percent less.   Farmland in North 
Dakota foreclosed during the 1930s was sold back to the original owners (at below market price) 
in the next decade.  In fact, the BND increased the amount of loans and letters of credit to North 
Dakota banks in need of liquidity during the GFC, albeit at a limited capacity given its own 
liquidity needs and its other funding obligations. Fortunately, North Dakota dodged the worst of 
the GFC, otherwise federal intervention may have been necessary. The public bank also aids the 
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state in economic development, issuing its first Federally-insured student loan in 1967. 
(https://bnd.nd.gov/history-of-bnd/)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over time the BND has shifted its focus from managing state investments and providing 
services to local banks in the 1940s and 50s to participating in student, commercial, and 
residential mortgage loans in the 90s, as shown by Figure 11.  In 2015, BND’s assets totaled $7.4 
billion, with approximately $4.34 billion in their total lending portfolio and $5.8 billion in 
deposits.57  Most of the bank’s deposits come from the state government agencies.  Thus, the 
BND maintains a large loan portfolio, the majority of which involves other community banks, 
while 50 percent of the portfolio is guaranteed by federal and state institutions.  Many loans are 
originated by the state’s private sector and partially funded by the BND; local financial 
institutions originated $3.9 billion of the Bank’s business and agricultural loans. Indeed, the 
BND coincides with a robust system of local financial institutions. In 2014, North Dakota had 
Figure 11 - Breakdown of BND's Assets 
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more banks and credit unions per capita than any other state, and almost six times more than the 
country as a whole. By participating in these loans, BND expands the lending capacity of North 
Dakota’s community banks, giving them added strength in competing against big out-of-state 
banks.  Moreover, locally owned banks and credit unions with under $10 billion in assets 
account for only 29 percent of deposits nationally, whereas in North Dakota they control 83 
percent of the state’s market.58  It is important to note that the BND was not designed to push out 
private financial institutions.  To the contrary, the Bank’s early policy sought to prevent harming 
the state’s existing financial institutions.59  
Since 1971, the BND has generated a profit each year, and often times produced a high 
ratio of return on assets (ROA) compared to similarly sized private banks.  The public bank 
enjoys certain advantages over its private counterparts, such as their tax-exempt status.  
However, unlike private banks, the BND’s deposits are not insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, only by the full faith and credit of ND.  Nonetheless, the BND is a prime 
example of how public banks can thrive.  Compared to other similarly sized banks across the 
nation, the BND had experienced fewer defaults and lower loan delinquency during the GFC.  In 
fact, there have been no bank failures in North Dakota since October, 2000.60  Only this year did 
ND’s economy fall, ending the state’s 15-year streak of revenue growth and budget surplus 
during which they cut hundreds of millions of dollars of income and property taxes for 
individuals and businesses.  ND is facing $1 billion budget shortfall due to falling state revenue 
collections resulting from the collapse in oil and natural gas prices.61  ND’s governor, Jack 
Dalrymple, has called for a significant budget reduction, subjecting 67 out of 73 state agencies to 
budget cuts, except for the BND.  There have been major events going on in ND, specifically the 
protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL).  State committees recently approved an 
emergency request to borrow $6 million to cover the cost of law enforcement at the DAPL site, 
which will come from the BND (likely at a low interest rate).62  Besides a large endowment of 
state funds, the BND also enjoys tax-exempt status and paying around 25 basis points lower 
interest rate on deposits than their private counterparts.  Nonetheless, the public bank has proven 
to be resilient and sustainable, considering the tough economic times recently befalling ND.  
It is hard to quantify the fiscal benefits provided by the BND just by looking at the state’s 
past economic performance/resilience, since North Dakota receives much revenue from its oil 
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endowments.  Regardless, the BND is a state-owned bank that partners with more than 100 
North Dakota financial institutions, promoting the development of the agriculture, commerce and 
industry, and stabilizing the state economy by improving access to credit for local businesses.  
For example, the BND’s Flex Pace loan program allows local communities to provide assistance 
to borrowers regarding job retention, technology development, retail and other small business 
services.  According to the BND’s 2010 Annual Report, 
The need for Flex PACE funding was substantial, growing by 62 percent to help finance essential 
community services as energy development spiked in western North Dakota. Commercial bank 
participation loans grew to 64 percent of the entire $1.022 billion portfolio. 
BND revenue from successful investments, essentially the state’s return on equity, can be used to 
patch state budget shortfalls, save for moments of intense fiscal stress.  Even then, the BND 
maintains important functions, such as clearing checks for both banks and credit unions, 
providing coin and currency, and holding an Automated Clearing House system that allows local 
banks to offer direct deposit and automated payment services to their customers. The 
aforementioned report estimates a total of $318 million in short-term credit lines were provided 
to 95 financial institutions in 2010.  Indeed, at times the BND can serve as a kind of mini Federal 
Reserve for its network of local financial institutions.  
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ND maintains stabilization funds, like most states, as a precautionary measure.  The BND 
is not infallible, hence there should be an alternative safety net.  Indeed, the state relies more 
often on the fiscal stabilization fund for moments of fiscal distress so as to preserve the BND’s 
liberty in its lending decisions, since diverting funds to stabilize state budgets may hinder their 
ability to supply credit to the private sector.  In fact, the BND has repeatedly made transfers to 
the state’s stabilization fund, as shown by Figure 12, demonstrating significant revenue-
generating capabilities.  From 1971 to 2009, transfers of profits from the BND comprised, on 
average, 0.75 percent of state expenditures, the local maximum being 1.82 percent in 1996. [ibid]   
Each year state legislatures negotiate with the Bank’s Governing Board to determine how much 
profit should be contributed to state funds, as set forth in the Bank’s initial policy, “… (3) To 
Figure 12 - Transfers to the North Dakota General Fund and 
Stabilization Fund 
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redeposit in the State, so far as is consistent with the operations of the bank… to the end that 
loans need not be called in…” [ibid]  In the last 20 years, BND has contributed $385 million to 
the general fund.  Such contributions to state funds have certainly helped the state government 
fill small budget gaps and increase safety nets, thanks to the BND’s ability to earn income by 
locally investing state revenues.  Though, the Bank will withhold from making contributions 
should they face increased risk and uncertainty, which has been the case since the Bank has not 
made contributions to ND’s general fund since 2009. [ibid] 
Although we cannot fully attribute the success of the North Dakotan economy to the 
performance of the BND, nonetheless, the bank has symbiotic relationships with private banks 
and businesses, and helps generate revenue for the state government.  The bank’s continuous 
transfers to government safety nets, liquidity provisions to local banks during crises, and 
emergency funding of jeopardized capital projects are all functions that serve to stabilize revenue 
streams and commercial activity.   The state should maintain alternative sources of emergency 
funding and fiscal safety nets so as not rely heavily on a public bank, since neither party is a 
currency issuer.  
While the BND is a good example of how public banks can provide revenue streams to 
state governments and credit to local businesses, there are certain features in the bank’s 
arrangement that are unique to ND.  For example, the BND is not subject to federal oversight 
because of its relatively small size and lack of FDIC insurance.  Keeping in mind the 
implications of the Dodd-Frank Act in regards to “systemically important institutions,” a public 
bank in, say, California would be a much larger operation that may warrant federal oversight.  
Yet, without a state bank, many billions of dollars in Californian tax revenue channeled through 
large private banks flow out of state or are used for speculative bets.  State-owned banks also 
redirect government funds flowing out-of-state back to productive circuits inside communities.  
Grand Forks, ND is one city that has benefitted from such public finance; in February 2016, they 
became eligible for a $15 million loan from the BND to finance city projects.  The loan is for a 
30-year period at a 2 percent interest rate, which are great terms relative to deals with the private 
sector.  Through private banking the municipality typically hires an investment advisor to help 
determine the appropriate credit options while taking into consideration the potential risks 
associated with different forms of credit.   
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Instead of having to pay fees to investment banks, SLGs could use a public bank to buy 
their bond issues at favorable terms.  A municipality could get a loan from the state-owned bank 
for an affordable housing development, infrastructure investment, or worker co-ops, in which 
case more state funds and future revenue are recaptured.  Indeed, the creditor and debtor 
relationship would be symbiotic, as the public bank would be interested in the success of local 
government and community projects.  The future revenue from productivity would go towards 
developing long-term capital pools as a significant source of funding.  According to a study by 
Karl Beitel at the Roosevelt Institute, “The total potential recapture by a Municipal Bank 
between 2008 and 2020 comes to $930.3 million, or an average of $68 million per year,” for the 
city of San Francisco.63    
While there are other examples of strong public banks in history, establishing these 
institutions through SLGs in the United States is a unique endeavor, considering the limitations 
of such sub-governments in regards to currency issuance and defending against systemic crises.  
Having established some precedent of successful state-owned banking, the next step is to 
examine the means states have to set up these public financial institutions and how they should 
be structured so as to build symbiotic institutional relationships that use SLG funds for local 
economic development.   
Literature Review 
The vast majority of the limited literature on public banks features cost-benefit analyses 
on the efficiency of state-owned banks versus private banks.  Indeed, many statistical studies 
have found that state-owned banks are less efficient than their private counterparts and hinder 
financial development, based on the orthodox theory that the market best allocates credit.  Other 
findings conclude that politics has a major influence on the way public banks lend, thereby 
producing inefficiencies. Sapienza (2004) uses a dataset on state-owned banks in Italy to study 
the efficiency of their credit allocation.  Her results show that, “state-owned banks charge 
systematically lower interest rates to similar or identical firms than do private banks,” and that 
such institutions tend to give more discounts on interest rates to provinces with similar political 
affiliations and larger-sized firms.  She ascribes to the political view of state-owned banks, which 
considers them to be a mechanism for supplying political patronage, to explain for their lower 
profitability and bias toward party affiliation and larger firm size.64 
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Coelho (et al. 2013) found that the entry of public banks in local markets in Brazil had 
little effect on private banks, suggesting they do not compete much with each other.  The impact 
of the second public bank entrant on existing banks’ private profits was equivalent to that of the 
fifth private entrant, suggesting that private banks are more competitive public banks (which was 
to be expected).  Their study also revealed that public banks have higher operating costs and 
spend more per bank account, thus corroborating the notion that public banks are less efficient, 
yet this may not necessarily be true if interest paid on deposits are included, as the state bank 
would not have to pay such interest.65  Rather than creating more state-owned banks, Andrianova 
(et al. 2008) suggest improving regulatory institutions to foster the development of private banks 
and ultimately reduce the role of state banks in the economy.  The study assumes public banks to 
be less efficient in their lending and investment decisions (coinciding with the political view), 
and the results show that, “the share of state control over bank assets is inversely related to 
institutional quality, as measured by the overall quality of regulation... and stringent disclosure 
requirements.” (p. 244) From their analysis they conclude that improving regulations and 
transparency is more effective than instituting public banks to foster financial and economic 
development.66   
Any analysis of public banking should seek to explain why state banks exist.  The 
aforementioned studies would likely agree with the view that state-owned banks are driven by 
political motives, which implies they are inherently inefficient and should not try to allocate 
capital.  Yet, all public policy has political motives; the next section provides examples of how 
the government already intervenes to produce more favorable outcomes. Orthodox theory 
champions free markets in its prescription for less government intervention; this is the same 
thinking that led to the GFC, in which banks securitized toxic loans to investors with the help of 
fraudulent credit ratings.67  Banks, along with money, are considered simply as intermediaries 
facilitating the investment of savings.  Therefore, it is believed that with more deregulation 
financial institutions will be better able to diversify (socialize) risks and innovate. To the 
contrary, heterodox theory considers state-owned banks to be a response to market gaps and 
institutional deficiency.   
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Market Shortfalls 
Surely there is a difference in missions between public, non-for-profit banks and private, 
for-profit banks.  The former is concerned with allocating credit to locally productive activity for 
a public purpose, while the latter seeks to allocate funds such that private profits are maximized.  
Coelho (et al.2013) describe this difference in purpose as “product differentiation,” as state 
banks in Brazil are structured to promote the development of rural credit and mortgages.  In 
Brazil’s case, the Banco do Brazil requires 50 percent of all demand deposits to be allocated to 
rural credit (i.e. financing capital to farmers), which is much less profitable given the higher 
delinquency costs and when taking into consideration attractive opportunity costs (e.g. derivative 
trading).  Agriculture is just one of the several sectors private banks tend to avoid.   
Other shortfalls in the way the free market allocates credit concern various types of 
discrimination, especially in the home mortgage market.  Mortgage lending is lengthy in nature, 
as loan officers must gather much personal information on borrowers, such as income, net worth, 
and credit history, often times through face-to-face interaction.  Other factors include the 
principal amount of the loan, the value of the property, and any macroeconomic trends computed 
by models.  Considering middle-class wage stagnancy and over indebtedness, to the point where 
almost 46 percent of Americans have said they do not have enough money to cover a $400 
emergency expense, many loan applicants have some characteristic that could lead to denial.68  
Indeed, many do not meet the criteria, while minorities are denied credit disproportionately; in 
Manhattan, 14.1 percent of white applicants are denied whereas 33.3 percent of black applicants 
and 24.7 percent of Hispanic applicants are denied. In addition to those denied based on credit 
criteria, there is also much discrimination throughout the process.69  Wheeler and Luke (2015) 
charge that, on average, Black Americans are denied more frequently than their White 
counterparts on loan applications, controlling for factors relating to creditworthiness and default 
risk.70   
Furthermore, the solicitation of loans to customers is discriminatory, as real estate 
developers systematically avoid new developments around certain neighborhoods - a practice 
known as red-lining.  Low-income communities are routinely segregated from amenities and 
retail resources, often where housing is of poor quality, economic and educational opportunities 
are out of reach, and concentrated poverty promotes the decay of social and physical 
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environments.71  Meltzer and Schuetz (2011) found that, in NYC, when compared to White 
communities, Black community zip codes had retail stores of smaller size and density, lower 
diversity in food service, and zero upscale chain groceries.72  The absence of retail development 
in minority communities makes every-day life harder, property values also suffer, thereby 
perpetuating high denial rates for mortgage loans.   
There are government agencies that aim to support neglected communities, such as the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which makes credit more available to low-income 
applicants.  Indeed, in 2013 black Americans comprised 37.9 percent of NYC’s FHA loan 
applicants, whereas 19.7 and 18.9 percent of the loan applicants were Hispanic and white, 
respectively.  The disproportion of denial rates for FHA applications in NYC is significantly less 
than that of the private market aforementioned, yet still high.67  Such an institution is an example 
of how the government can use its faculties to promote public welfare, in this case by allocating 
credit to communities in need.  More stimulus is necessary for moving toward a fairer and 
equitable system of homeownership; again to use New York as an example, “over 41 percent of 
white New Yorkers are homeowners, while only 26.5 percent of black New Yorkers and 16.1 
percent of Hispanic New Yorkers own their own homes.”73 
However, the FHA alone is not enough to defeat the systemic problems regarding 
homeownership.  According to a Zillow report, the average denial rates on FHA loans 
nationwide are only slightly lower than the ratios shown in Figure 13, 24.3 percent of blacks, 
20.5 percent of Hispanics, and 14.2 percent of whites are denied.  Thus, while the FHA can make 
impacts on local communities like NYC, the public agency does not have enough power or 
resources to systematically rebalance the scales.  In fact, the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) 
has moved away from providing targeted support to the US housing finance system.  Initially, 
the FHLB limited membership to mortgage-oriented institutions, namely thrifts and insurance 
companies, until the 1980s thrift crisis and a series of deregulation that expanded FHLB 
membership to include more diversified depository institutions, such as commercial banks and 
credit unions. Loan advances were no longer limited to the use of mortgage finance, hence 
commercial bank members are able to use advances to fund virtually any type of financial asset.  
Today, the vast majority of FHLB loans go to the largest private banks, to which Frame (2016) 
admits, “ Such institutions do not need FHLB access as they can issue in public debt markets 
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and… borrow from the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window.”74  Hence, it seems private banks 
are usurping FHLB loans to augment their profits. 
The solution to such market failures is not the orthodox prescription of deregulation, 
which often leads to excessive risk-taking.  Nor will (surface-level) improvements to regulatory 
institutions and transparency end the massive flows of credit accruing to the largest financial 
institutions and investors (e.g. Dodd Frank).75  Private financial institutions cannot be expected 
to fulfill such a role, as their core business models and lending practices are based on profit-
maximization.  They can expect to make much higher returns by selling opaque financial 
products and speculation, which is easier to do in deregulated environments.  Rarely does their 
maximizing self-interest align with promoting public welfare, unless the government plays a 
role.  Even the self-proclaimed venture capitalist firms receive help from government agencies, 
as Mazzucato (2014) notes.76  Rather than increase regulation in an attempt to get private firms 
to do something, there is another, more direct option to improve local credit allocation.   
Establishing State Banks 
An effective way to stimulate credit-starved, local communities is to establish a 
mechanism that makes low-cost credit more accessible for socially productive purposes.  
Government itself is a unique social institution with the power to tax and make markets, and thus 
is capable of allocating resources based on egalitarian principles and more ecologically sound 
urban development.  The individual size, form, and orientation will vary from bank to bank, 
considering the social, economic and industrial differences among the fifty states.  Therefore, 
such structural decisions should be left to the discretion of state governments and its 
representative agencies.  Nonetheless, the purpose of the state bank should be to redistribute 
credit to distressed communities while investing in a green future.   
Beitell (2016) outlines the organizational structure of municipal banks, regarding 
capitalization and redistributive lending initiatives that increase public utility.  He posits two 
options state governments have for creating their own municipal financial institution; the first 
would be to use local ordinances or a voter-approved charter amendment to directly establish a 
fully-developed, state-owned depository institution that makes loans to other state agencies and 
offers retail banking services.  The other option would be a longer, multi-step process in which 
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state governments first establish a limited non-depository institution then expand operations over 
time.  Rather than directly charter a full-size depository institution, which would require tough 
legal compliance, state governments should initially establish an independent non-depository 
financial organization tasked with making long-term residential and infrastructure investments. 
The latter method is more politically strategic, but also technically viable, as it is easier to add 
departments to the foundation of a municipal finance institution.  Over time, after these 
institutions prove to be successful, hopefully state legislators would be more open to approving 
the charter of a depository institution.  Indeed, establishing a good track record for public 
banking helps build momentum for other finance initiatives.  For example, postal unions and 
civil rights groups, along with figures like the U.S. Postal Service inspector general and senator 
Bernie Sanders, can use the success of state banking to warrant the expansion of USPS financial 
operations, a move that would make USPS relevant again and protect low-income communities 
from predatory payday lenders and check-cashing outlets.77  Nonetheless, aside from the 
different political implications between the two options, the institutional and ownership structure 
of state bank remains the same.  
State governments can charter an organization, such as a legal benefit or non-profit 
corporation (depending on state law) that has a foundational set of public policy goals (i.e. 
investing in affordable housing and green energy projects).   Specifically, as Beitell suggests, the 
state bank would be defined as a Bank Holding Company per USC 12, Sec. 1841, which would 
make it subject to oversight by the Federal Reserve.  Like the BND, state banks across the nation 
would hold public funds, mainly those of, but not limited to, state and local government agencies 
and community organizations.  The state bank may receive its initial capital from the 
government’s general fund, or from any interest being earned on funds held in government 
investment pools.  Not all states have a cash surplus readily available to create a bank, in which 
case a direct appropriation of money from the general fund or a new bond issuance may also be 
options.  Furthermore, the state bank should not require continued government subsidy for its 
existence, only an initial lump sum of money for its establishment.  Thereafter, government 
agency funds would be held as deposits at the bank.  Deposits at the state bank would be 
considered liabilities, while its assets include loans and securities.  Subsequent revenue earned 
on loans and secondary market activity may then accumulate to equity, thereby allowing the state 
bank to make more loans and issue deposits while maintaining the same capital ratio.  State 
 51 
banks can use their stock of Treasuries as collateral to borrow Fed Funds, which would be would 
be necessary should the bank be denied access to the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window.  
Once the state bank is funded and running it can immediately make loans to any 
organization or individual it deems creditworthy for any project that coincides with their public 
policy goals.  Moreover, there need not be a transfer of existing funds at the inception of a loan, 
as the state bank, much like its private counterparts, can credit accounts simply using computer 
keystrokes.  There is no technical obstacle to issuing deposits, unless imposed politically, so long 
as there are willing creditors and debtors.  Banks do not lend out reserves, as there is no pool of 
money (besides the Fed Funds market) sitting somewhere waiting to be transferred.  Rather, in 
today’s capitalist economies, reserves (deposits at the Fed) help to facilitate payments systems.  
Reserves stabilize gaps between inflows and outflows after daily operations, which is also the 
purpose of interbank lending in the Federal Reserve System, since banks can lend more even 
while reserves decrease. Fractional reserve banking requires that banks hold a fraction of their 
demand deposits at the central bank.  However, this is a politically imposed restriction that 
misconstrues how banks create money.  Indeed, loans create deposits, which then circulate inside 
and outside of the Federal Reserve System.   
 
Table 2 – State Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Reserves (Cash, U.S. Treasuries) Deposits 
Loans Non-deposit liabilities 
Bonds and securities Equity 
 
A state bank can operate similarly; if it were to make a million dollar loan to an 
affordable housing developer, the operation would be to simultaneously create an asset and a 
liability on their balance sheet.  As shown in Table 3, the loan becomes an asset and the housing 
developer’s million dollar deposit a liability.  The developer could then write checks to pay 
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contractors, which would likely be presented at another bank, in which case the state bank would 
owe reserves to other banks, and vice versa.  Deposits are either converted to cash, thus entering 
physical circulation and reducing reserves, or circulate virtually in the computerized banking 
system whereby reserves are credited and debited. While reserves are used for clearing, capital is 
held against loans just in case catastrophe hits.  Capital held at state banks can be used as 
collateral to borrow reserves (central bank deposits).  These liquid assets would be used to make 
secondary markets and facilitate low-cost payments systems for low-income communities.  State 
banks would only hold cash should they manage local depository institutions.  Unless deposits 
(created by loans) are converted to cash and taken out of the digital system, banks in the 
aggregate cannot readily reduce their reserves, except by buying Treasuries from the Fed.  
Hence, membership to the Federal Home Loan Bank and access to the Federal Reserve’s 
Discount Window would greatly help state banks perform all depository financial services and 
extend short-term lines of credit.   
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Having established the structure of the state bank’s balance sheet and its sources of 
funding, the next step is to discern its relationships with other public and private institutions.  
SLG agencies and community organizations that would benefit from having an account at the 
state bank include funds and trusts for affordable housing, education and social investment, 
worker unions and cooperatives, and other non-profit, community institutions.  Once an account 
is opened, those institutions with formulated ideas for capital projects will be able to receive 
credit.  The state bank could also purchase or underwrite any new SLG debt issuance.  Ideally, 
the terms of the loans would be simple and cheap, as state banks are not looking to optimize 
returns. Therefore, complex financial products – those involving speculation and usurious fees – 
are not necessary.  SLGs should not have to deny certain communities essential public services 
Figure 14 - Institutional Relationships 
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for the sake of repaying ballooning debt.  Moreover, low interest rates in turn help to reduce 
default rates. 
Figure 14 depicts the state bank’s operations with public and private institutions.  The 
bank would have the deepest bonds with the SLG agencies and community organizations whose 
funds make the deposit base.  Deposits (the bank’s liabilities) are issued in making loans (the 
bank’s assets).  SLG agencies could then write checks to pay contractors and third parties, who 
in turn present the check to be deposited or cashed at their private bank, in which case the state 
bank then owes reserves to private banks.  Rather than try to gain direct access to the Fed Funds 
market, which entails passing regulatory requirements set forth by the Fed and FDIC, state banks 
may use the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) for reserve lending to settle 
their payments at the end of the day.  The bank can also work with institutional investors; 
mortgages and commercial loans originated by the state bank, whose risks have been properly 
assessed, can be securitized and sold to a variety of institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, 
Real Estate Investment Trusts, insurance companies, etc.)  Recognizing that the loans originated 
by the state bank will likely charge a lower interest rate than those of the private sector, Beitell 
notes, “...only a small portion of any given pension fund or endowment is likely be allocated to 
this class of assets.”  Securitization would not be a major activity for state banks since they are 
not seeking profit. Moreover, secondary markets should have boundaries, as the state bank has 
no business supporting out-of-state housing and small businesses.  Neither should the state bank 
deal with opaque financial products that may be toxic, like the many mortgage-backed securities 
that failed in 2007.  Besides directly loaning to organizations, the state bank can also partner with 
community banks to help ensure that local communities receive credit by participating in 
originated mortgages by local financial institutions, much like Fannie and Freddie and the BND.  
Local banks could also benefit by being matched with individual homebuyers through the state 
bank.  Nonetheless, the state bank must prioritize allocating credit to promote public welfare 
over secondary market dealings.  
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Summary 
Establishing a state bank tasked with managing the funds of and making loans to SLG 
government agencies would improve credit access for the communities that need it most.  Not 
only could there be more investment in the states’ housing and infrastructure (particularly in 
larger-scale affordable housing and ecologically sustainable developments), but also a significant 
amount of savings as a result of having more alternatives to Wall Street for municipal finance.  
While the orthodox economists consider the tendency of state banks to charge lower interest 
rates as a political inefficiency, others consider it to be a testament to the fact that state banks are 
less predatory than their large, private counterparts.  Nonetheless, there are several challenges to 
arranging and maintaining state banks across the United States.  
First, each state has unique legal structures and economies that have different 
implications for establishing a state bank.  Such an institution in, say, California would look 
vastly loan portfolio than one in Nebraska.  Public banks in states with large urban centers and 
diverse industries will have an easier time issuing and underwriting credit than such institutions 
in rural states in the mid-west.  Those based in urban environments may focus more on 
developing affordable housing, whereas agriculture will be more pertinent elsewhere.  Each state 
bank will have a unique lending portfolio that carries different risks.  Thus, some state banks 
may require more capitalization or liquidity than others to hedge their unique risks.  
Another challenge is to establish safeguards against conflicts of interest and political 
corruption.  It is important that the state bank is supervised in a manner that keeps the 
organization committed to supporting disadvantaged communities.  Therefore, those governing 
the bank should be appointed by the state governor for a limited term upon meeting certain 
criteria that demonstrates professional expertise, while the director of such a board would be 
serve limited terms.  The bank management would have a large degree of autonomy in deciding 
how loan portfolios are composed so as to best meet the unique needs of the local communities.  
Corruption and conflicts of interest can be fought with full transparency regarding the state 
bank’s lending decisions and risk exposure, along with independent audits and periodical reports 
so that governing boards are held accountable to their constituents.  Since the governor would 
hold the power to appoint board members, the bank would be mainly owned by the state 
government.   Other individuals may be allowed a degree of ownership as well, albeit 
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subordinate to that of the state.  Using voter-approved ballot measures to guide bank activities 
can be an effective safeguard against political corruption and deregulation.  For example, the 
state bank can require approval by at least two-thirds of its shareholders/constituents to make any 
changes to the legal structure of the bank.  Other safeguards involve independent audits and 
portfolio reviews or leverage limits.  Regardless, state officials and bank managers need to be 
held accountable so that the needs of the communities and institutions whose tax dollars and 
funds are held at the state bank are prioritized. 
 Since the establishment of state banks would mean a huge loss of fee revenue for the 
large financial institutions on Wall Street, there is always the risk that politicians may be 
pressured by powerful private interests to deregulate or defund the state bank.  The fact that state 
banks tend to charge lower interest rates on loans is not necessarily an inefficiency, rather 
demonstrates the bank’s ability to reduce fees and debt servicing costs. However, there is the risk 
that the state bank may fail, maybe along with other financial institutions when the next systemic 
economic crisis happens, or due to the uncertainty inherent to long-term investing.  Remember, 
SLGs are not currency issuers, and therefore cannot readily bail out institutions like the Federal 
Government or Federal Reserve can.  Hence state officials may have to decide whether to bail 
out the state bank if things turn sour. State banks can also fall in trouble if the Federal Reserve 
enacts severe rate hikes, as doing so would cause severe financial disruption, much like how the 
Volcker Experiment in the 1980s helped push the majority of thrifts into insolvency.   The 
chances of default will rise significantly if the state bank is deregulated to allow more asset 
classes in its investment portfolio so as to improve returns.  Let us not forget where speculative 
activities led the world’s economies in 2007; state banks cannot allow the same thing to happen 
to them.   
State banks do not need to preoccupy themselves with returns, since they are not trying to 
make private profits.  The way they promote public welfare is by giving state and local 
government a lower-cost alternative for municipal finance, thereby saving SLGs money, and by 
allocating credit for noble purposes, such as affordable housing and ecologically sustainable 
infrastructure development.  Allowing state governments to develop their own monetary entity 
helps mobilize resources for the public purpose.  Private, for-profit institutions do not have to fail 
for state banks to succeed; rather the two entities can coexist, as is the case in North Dakota.  The 
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former cannot be expected to self-regulate or solve disproportionalities in credit allocation, as 
orthodox economists profess.  History reveals that the interests of powerful, for-profit firms 
hardly coincide with the public interest (e.g. environmental degradation, massive home 
foreclosures).  Minsky found stability to be destabilizing, as private financial institutions increase 
leverage and lower underwriting standards (increasing risk), eventually moving from hedge 
financing to Ponzi financing.78  Since private spending and lending are mainly pro-cyclical, a 
public bank can help stabilize the finances of SLGs and various agencies. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Many SLGs have not recovered from the GFC as robustly as corporations and financial 
markets in the last decade.  Rather, they face substantial fiscal pressure from stagnating revenue 
and ever-increasing expenditures.  A greater portion of SLG funds is flowing to private financial 
institutions in the form of interest and banking fees, thereby inducing even more fiscal strain 
from subsequent austerity measures.  Governments should not be forced to withhold essential 
goods and services  (e.g. water, healthcare, etc.) or stop important capital projects to repay debt.  
Paying financial rent should not come before protecting public welfare. The numerous failed 
financial deals suggest SLGs have a hard time controlling monetary operations if they keep 
turning to the money managers on Wall Street for municipal finance and investment.   
Government safeguards should be put in place to redirect the flow of credit towards the 
local communities they are meant to represent and serve.  States can charter their own financial 
institution with the task of providing low-cost credit for projects aimed at improving public 
utility.  Recognizing the nature of credit creation in the US banking system, the state bank will 
be able to make loans immediately and without continual funding support from the state 
government.  Hence, caution is needed in constructing the legal framework so that labor unions 
and other community organizations are involved and adequately represented in its management; 
they must be able to resist unnecessary and damaging deregulatory pressure. 
 The scope of this paper is limited to setting the theoretical foundation for a state bank. 
Further research could study how such an institution would operate in a particular state or region.  
Yet more questions need to be addressed. In which areas should state banks compete with private 
retail and commercial banks?  Should the state bank be prohibited from certain financial 
activities? How would a state bank in a metropolis operate differently than one in a mainly rural 
state?  How would their balance sheets differ?  Nonetheless, any further analysis should explore 
how best to structure a state bank.  
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